Via Fark (where my paraphrased title also comes from), the BBC reports that Iraq Survey Group (a charming euphemism, if I’ve ever heard one) team leader David Kay has stepped down:
In a statement released by the CIA, Mr Kay said: “While there are many unresolved issues, I am confident that the ISG (Iraq Survey Group) will do everything possible to answer remaining questions about the former Iraqi regime’s WMD efforts.” But in a telephone interview with Reuters, Mr Kay said of the alleged weapons stockpiles: “I don’t think they existed. What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the last Gulf War and I don’t think there was a large-scale production programme in the 90s.”
Despite my scepticism about the US-led effort in Iraq, I really believed they were going to find something (besides those hummus-covered mortar shells). Particularly since they captured Saddam Hussein, I figured it was only a matter of time before something emerged out of the desert.
Kay’s quote is intriguing. Did he always think that the WMD weren’t out there? If so, was he really the right guy for the job? Or is he just practicing political butt-coverage in case some WMD do show up?
I’ve already expressed my concerns about what the lack of WMD says about the US administration or their intelligence services.
DarrenBarefoot.com 
American intelligence so often seems based on technologically-aquired information. That is, the reliance on intercepted phone calls, satellite photos and the like supercedes actual on-the-ground intelligence gathered from operatives talking to real people. I’ve seen this criticism of the CIA especially, but of the American approach to intelligence gathering in general, surface in different forms over the years; most recently with respect to how the Iraq insurgency effort had been so elusive and unexpected (though I think there was some real self-delusion there about how much people would welcome well-intentioned chaos over the orderly but brutal hand of Hussein).
The point is that intelligence gathering needs a mix of technology and people – and not just traitors to the enemy who have an axe to grind and will tell their new friends whatever they want to hear. No matter how much they can see from the air, it’s evident it means squat until they have people on the ground to confirm it.
An aside – wasn’t David Kay someone else’s replacement? This is the job nobody seems to want.
To me, all this talk about the credibility of US Intelligence is a polite way to bypass the fact that the Bush Administartion was going to invade Iraq come hell or high water. The intelligence community was never ringing the alarm over Iraq.
In fairness, there was no real alarm in August of 2001 either.
As far as Bush and his cronies go: There was a determination to ‘make it happen’ unlike anything I have ever seen in international affairs. The fact that WMD were never found is far from surprising in my mind. They had none to begin with (12 months ago) About three quarters of the evidence presented prior to the war was hypothesis or dusted off evidence from 1990-1991.
Personally my view has always been that there aren’t any WMDs, that the most they will find are old stockpiles.
Despite Saddam being a horrible dictator, there’s never been any real indication that Iraq ever had a WMD program since the scrutiny after the chemical weapon usage with the Kurds. The U.N. inspectors said so and it’s no shock to me that the U.S. led investigations eventually have to admit it as well.
As to whether he was the right man for the job? Any investigative position requires some former knowledge, sounds like he’s based an opinion on what he had learned.
I am not at all sure that Saddam did not have actual WMD’s. The UN inspectors thought he did, all the world’s intelligence services thought he did. And, of course, they could all have been wrong and the Iraqi position with its calculated evasions might have been nothing but bluff.
Or, Saddam got the weapons out of the country or out into the desert long before the war started.
Frankly I’d be delighted if Saddam turns out never to have had WMDs – except for the gas he used on the Kurds and the Iranians – because it would mean one less place Al Qaeda and its ilk could get such weapons.
Politically, while it may make some difference in England, it is unlikely to hurt Bush. The people who were adamently against the war were hardly going to change their minds if weapons had been found; the people in favour still have the liberation of Iraq and the removal of Saddam to be delighted by.
The intelligence community may be a little chastened; but I doubt it. After all, if they had said Saddam had no WMDs and nerve gas greeted the troops at Basra, you can imagine the outrage. Being wrong is part of the intelligence game. They are not called intelligence “estimates” for nothing.
Trained incapacities — I think I’ve diagnosed why Bush is getting away with murder (of both his own soldiers and Iraqis).
I don’t have time to get into it much on here, but it’s a concept I’ve been thinking about the past few days.
Bottom line: Bush lied about his reasons to put the US in Iraq. I just wish the people back home would get a clue and vote him out of office, before we invade another country.
p.s. Isn’t it funny (ironic) that Bush quotes as evidence the Kay Report in his State of the Union speech this week — and it’s the same week Kay resigns his post?